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 The concept of  the gift fascinates many 
authors from a variety of  traditions, and not always 
for similar reasons. Differing hermeneutics give 
rise to different visions of  this basic experience of  
humanity—the concept of  the gift—and allow for 
differing articulations both of  its essential form, 
and its very possibility or impossibility. This project 
sets in dialogue two authors whose work touches 
significantly on formulations of  the gift: Louis-
Marie Chauvet and Jacques Derrida. After briefly 
outlining each author’s approach to the gift (specifi-
cally its form and possibility, or lack thereof), the 
discussion moves to comparing and contrasting 
their approaches. The project finishes by arguing 
that Chauvet constructs a specific nuance in his 
concept of  the gift/symbol that is absent in Der-
rida—and that Derrida would not agree with—and 
suggests that at least one reason for this difference 
is the differing hermeneutics with which each au-
thor approaches the subject matter.
Louis-Marie Chauvet
 For Chauvet, the importance of  the 
concept of  the gift derives from the place it holds 
in the divine-human relationship. This is not to 
say that Chauvet lacks a conception of  human-
to-human giving, but rather to say that his work 
is concentrated primarily in the area of  Christian 
sacraments and liturgy, which means for him that 
the origins of  the gift are in God. In order to 
understand Chauvet’s trajectory, this section of  the 
discussion briefly explores one main avenue in his 
thought, that of  “symbolic exchange,” as well as the 
concepts that undergird it and spring from it.
 In order to approach Chauvet’s concept of  
symbolic exchange, it is important to take a cur-
sory glance at what Chauvet means by “symbolic,” 
or how he conceives of  “symbol.”1  For Chauvet, 
symbol is one of  two methods of  human com-
munication, the other being “sign.”2  These two 
levels of  communication, while ultimately insepa-
rable from one another, comprise quite different 
ways of  speaking about reality. Chauvet is careful 
never to absolutely separate the levels of  sign and 
symbol from one another (for him they are always 
intertwined),3 but in the interest of  conciseness this 
discussion intentionally leaves that nuance largely 
by the wayside. When Chauvet speaks of  signs, he 
means the use of  things in order to allow language 
to convey ideas at something approaching face 
value. A sign represents something—an idea, an 
object, an entity—in a way that keeps that some-
thing at arm’s length; the sign is a method of  simple 
discourse.
 The symbol on the other hand, is for 
Chauvet the locus of  a mediation of  reality, rather 
than a signification of  it. While a sign points its 
recipient to the thing signified, the symbol bears 
the reality of  the thing symbolized to the recipient. 
In an example Chauvet uses to tease this difference 
out, he speaks of  two uses of  the word “flower,” 
one as a sign and one as a symbol.4  If  the word 
flower is used in a conversation between people dis-
cussing horticulture, it simply signifies the concept 
of  flowers in order to exchange information be-
tween the two participants. It signifies what the two 
are speaking of. On the other hand, if  a person is 
lost and alone in a strange place and hears someone 
1 A full explanation of Chauvet’s theology of symbol runs far 
beyond the scope of the current discussion. As this is the case, 
the discussion limits itself to only those aspects of Chauvet’s 
theology of symbol that directly bear on the gift.
2  Louis-Marie Chauvet, The Sacraments: The Word of God at the 
Mercy of the Body, trans. Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, MN: 
The Liturgical Press, 2001), 74-75.
3 Ibid., 79.
4 Ibid., 75.
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say, “flower,” the person is not immediately drawn 
into a conversation of  horticulture, but rather 
into the realization that he or she is not alone, and 
that there is someone near who speaks a common 
language. The word flower has symbolized the near-
ness of  a person who may help, or at least someone 
with whom the lost person can speak. Flower, in 
this case, has symbolized the reality of  the situation 
and the other person—it has become a mediation.
 The importance of  the distinction between 
symbol and sign in Chauvet’s thought (at least as 
it relates to the gift) is that the sign belongs to the 
world and logic of  value/business exchange, while 
the symbol belongs to the world and logic of  gift 
exchange.5  That there is indeed some kind of  
difference between these two logics is something 
Chauvet seems to take for granted (he cites Marcel 
Mauss’s seminal work The Gift and assumes Mauss 
makes a good case therein),6 but before exploring 
the validity of  this assumption, it would be prudent 
to point out the implications Chauvet draws from 
this distinction.
 First, Chauvet argues, since the symbol 
is within the logic of  gift-exchange, and since it is 
a bearer of  reality rather than simply a referential 
tool, the value of  the symbolic object itself  is of  no 
concern.7  Instead, what is important in the symbol 
is its ability to mediate the reality it symbolizes. The 
symbol bears some reality to a recipient; it medi-
ates the identity of  its giver in order to precipitate 
recognition on the part of  the receiver.8  This is not 
the same as a sign pointing to some object to be 
recognized. The symbol bears a whom who is to be 
recognized by the recipient. Both the sign and the 
symbol are given from someone to someone else, 
but in exchanging a sign it is the what that matters; 
in giving a symbol what matters is the who who is 
given to whom. In this light, the symbol in Chauvet 
might be said to be inexhaustibly subjective—the 
symbol bears the reality of  the giver in order to 
make recognition possible in the receiver. Simply 
put, symbols are self-communication. They allow 
5 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Re-
interpretation of Christian Existence, trans. Patrick Madigan, SJ, and 
Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 
1995), 102-107.
6 See for example his discussion of Mauss (Chauvet, Symbol and 
Sacrament, 100-102). C.f. also Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form 
and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. W.D. Halls (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1990).
7 Chauvet, The Sacraments, 84.
8 Chauvet, The Sacraments, 74; Symbol and Sacrament, 112.
one subject to communicate him- or herself  to 
another subject.9
 Second, reception of  a symbol requires 
some degree of  participation on the part of  the re-
ceiver—it is never an objective reception. In the ex-
change of  a sign, one might imagine two essentially 
disinterested parties transferring some knowledge 
or object from one to the other, and subsequently 
continuing on their respective ways unchanged. 
This is because in signs the what is important—I 
might give someone a certain something, and it is 
the transfer of  that thing that might be essential. 
However if, when I give that something to some-
one, what is important is instead the relationship 
that I am forging with him or her, I have largely 
exited the world of  sign and entered the symbolic. 
This means, since it is a relationship that is at stake, 
the only possible way to receive the something is 
actively—that is, for the receiver to take some action 
with regard to the thing, the giver, and the receiver 
him- or herself. 
 All this is to say that symbolic exchange—
i.e. the gift—requires in its reception a return-gift. In 
Chauvet’s words, “there is ‘reception’ (of  the gift as 
gift) only by the obligatory implication of  a return-
gift. In other words, the return-gift is the mark of  
reception.”10  In symbolic exchange, there can be 
no discrete chronological (or even just logical) steps 
of  receiving and then responding. Rather, receiving 
and responding are simultaneous actions of  the full 
predicate of  symbolic exchange. Since the symbol 
mediates one subject to the other, the relationship—
necessarily a dynamic concept—is altered, so recep-
tion as dynamic is the only possibility. Reception 
and return-gift cannot play out as act and response. 
The gift is only received by virtue of  the return-gift.
 To be fair, there is a specific telos Chauvet 
has in mind when he forges this construction of  
symbol and the gift (a hermeneutic about which he 
is forthcoming and unapologetic): Christian life/
ethics and liturgy. For him, the whole point of  
speaking of  symbol and the gift at all is to un-
derstand more fully the giver par excellence: God in 
Christ, made present in the sacraments, especially 
at the Eucharist. In order to more fully apprehend 
Chauvet’s conception of  the gift and symbol, this 
section concludes with a brief  look at how he sees 
them playing out in Christianity.
9 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 119.
10 Chauvet, The Sacraments, 122.
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 The first immediately apparent point is that 
for Chauvet, since the symbol is a mediation of  
one self  to another, that which is mediated in the 
Christian imagination is the reality of  God’s love as 
grace. For Chauvet, God initiates the gift of  grace 
as exactly that—gratuitous giving, without provoca-
tion—and gives it in a character of  graciousness, 
that is, in a character of  being beyond price or ap-
praisal.11  What is given in grace, if  it can be called 
anything, is the love of  God for us, and as such it is 
characterized by gratuitousness (in that it is free and 
undeserved) and graciousness (in that it is outside 
of  price, “beyond the useful and the useless”).12  
The grace of  God is not for Chauvet a thing trans-
ferred; rather it is a reality mediated. It cannot be 
signified—it can only be symbolized.
 This last is the reason Chauvet is so keen 
on a theology of  the sacraments. For him, the me-
diation of  grace takes place through the symbols of  
the sacraments—especially the Eucharist.13  Since 
we are bodily creatures, the only ways in which we 
can appropriate any measure of  reality are bodily 
ways.14  Symbols allow that which is not essentially 
bodily to be mediated to those who essentially are. 
In the Eucharist, the reality of  God’s grace—in Je-
sus Christ—becomes present in the bread and wine, 
which in turn mediate that reality to the gathered 
Christian community. The gift is given as a symbol, 
which is to say (for Chauvet), in the most real way 
possible.
 While God does give grace freely in the 
Eucharist, recall that for Chauvet, reception of  the 
gift is predicated only by the recipients’ return-gift. 
In this way Chauvet is able to link the celebration 
of  the Eucharist immediately to Christian ethics. 
It might be easy at this point to reify grace and ac-
tion in Chauvet’s vision, arguing that God gives us 
something in the Eucharist, and we in turn must re-
pay God by giving things to others. However, such 
would be a misreading of  the thrust of  Chauvet’s 
argument. In his conception, the graciousness 
of  God’s gift in the Eucharist (that which puts it 
11 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 108-109.
12 Ibid.
13 One might be able to speak about God’s grace outside the 
sacraments in the theology of Chauvet, but such a question runs 
beyond the scope of this discussion.
14 Chauvet’s theology of the body is tied directly to that of lan-
guage, symbol, and mediation. Too much detail is unwarranted 
here, but suffice it to say that Chauvet can even speak of the 
body as the “arch-symbol” mediating human reality (Chauvet, 
Symbol and Sacrament, 151).
outside economic calculation) is essential also to 
the return-gift of  the human recipients.15  Humans 
cannot repay that which is outside of  value. They 
cannot give back in either want or excess—they 
can only respond in kind or out of  kind. Receiving 
grace as the act of  God (or, as Godself) is insepa-
rable from giving oneself  back as a subject through 
whom grace can continue to be given.16  Christians 
only successfully receive the Eucharist when they 
respond with the love of  neighbor, which is medi-
ated through bodily acts of  charity/ethics (and 
likewise, if  Christians respond without love of  
neighbor, God’s gift of  grace has been frustrated). 
God’s grace in this way has been successfully medi-
ated to Christians only when they respond with 
graciousness toward others. This is not calculation 
and repayment. This is reception as response; grace 
as gift necessarily proliferates itself, else it was never 
received at all.
Jacques Derrida
 Unlike Chauvet, Derrida approaches the 
idea of  the gift as anything but a given. For him, the 
gift is exactly what he calls “the impossible.”17  Giv-
ing is not necessarily impossible (though it is only in 
light of  death that giving and taking are possible),18 
but giving a/the gift is the impossible. As such, 
speaking of  the gift for Derrida is always speak-
ing of  something that cannot be nailed down—it 
is an enigma. This section of  the discussion briefly 
explores the specific kind of  impossibility that 
Derrida sees in the gift, and moves subsequently on 
to explore what in his thought the gift (if  there is 
any)19 might be, or what it must look like. 
 
15 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 109.
16 Phillipe Bordeyne, “The Ethical Horizon of Liturgy,” in Sac-
raments: Revelation of the Humanity of God: Engaging the Fundamental 
Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet, eds. Philippe Bordeyne and Bruce 
T. Morrill (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2008), 130.
17 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy 
Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 7.
18 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret, 2nd ed., 
trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 
45. The relation of the gift to death is a worthy topic in order 
to completely understand where Derrida is coming from with 
the concept of the gift. However, this discussion limits itself to 
a brief outline of Derrida’s vision, and so will draw almost ex-
clusively from his work Given Time rather than The Gift of Death.
19 Derrida often uses this phrase in qualifying the impossible. 
He does not want to presume anything about the gift, least of 
all its existence.
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 For Derrida, the gift is impossibility—“not 
impossible but the impossible.”20  This distinction 
may seem slight, but understanding what Derrida 
means by it helps throw into sharper relief  a good 
deal of  what he does with the gift. There are certain 
things in the world that are simply impossible: palm 
trees do not grow in the tundra, it is impossible to 
see amoebas without a microscope, and people will 
never be wholly satisfied with whatever the cur-
rent tax rate is. However, these impossible things 
are characterized by a specific type of  impossibility, 
namely, they are impossible because some element 
in them is left wanting. Palm trees want for hardi-
ness; if  they could survive colder temperatures, 
perhaps they could indeed grow in the tundra. 
The human eye wants for keenness; if  it were a 
good deal keener, we might be able to see amoebas 
without using microscopes. And of  course, if  taxes 
were just and humans were patient and charitable, 
perhaps we could be satisfied with the rate. 
 In each of  these situations, want precipi-
tates impossibility. However, one could imagine 
a world in which these things would not be im-
possible. The issues are derivatively impossible; if  
circumstances were different, they might indeed 
be possible. This is qualitatively different from the 
impossibility of  the gift. For Derrida, the gift is the 
impossible, that is, the essence of  what makes a gift 
also makes it impossible. This might be called intrin-
sic impossibility, and it also has its members: round 
squares, hot ice, vegetarian steaks, and other things 
that border on the absurd. These are trite examples, 
but they approximate where Derrida wants to go 
with the gift. As gift, the gift is impossibility. Its 
impossibility does not derive from anything lack-
ing about the concept, the material, or the perfor-
mance. Rather, it is the impossible precisely because 
those things that constitute it are—as a set—impos-
sible. For Derrida, it is not want that makes the gift 
impossible; it is exactly the purity of  the gift—the 
necessary purity—that qualitatively separates it 
from the realm of  the possible.
 The constitution of  the gift in Derrida, i.e. 
the essential elements that precipitate the gift’s im-
possibility, might be thought of  as threefold: (1) the 
structure of  the gift, (2) the character of  the gift, 
and (3) the matter of  the gift.21  The first constitu-
tive element of  the gift, that of  its structure, Der-
20 Derrida, Given Time, 7.
21 Here I mean matter as body or material, not matter as issue 
or problem.
rida explains as deriving basically from convention: 
“some ‘one’ intends to give or gives ‘something’ to 
‘someone other.’”22  For the gift to be a gift, there 
ought to be a giver, a gift, and a receiver—absence 
of  any of  these three components causes the gift to 
present itself  to us as incomplete.23  Derrida points 
out that this structure in the end amounts to a 
tautology; if  we try to explain what the structure of  
the gift is, we immediately assume that our audience 
already has some “precomprehension” of  the gift.24  
In his words, when I define the gift’s structure, “I 
suppose that I know and that you know what ‘to 
give,’ ‘gift,’ ‘donor,’ ‘donee,’ mean in our common 
language.”25  This is the first constituent and also 
the first trouble with the gift—any attempt to ap-
prehend its structure of  giver-gift-receiver presup-
poses its definition in the explanation—but this 
does not, on its own, make the gift the impossible. 
For that, the other two constitutive elements are 
needed.
 The second constitutive element of  the 
gift, its character, is what ought to separate it from 
an economic exchange of  goods or services: the 
gift must be gratuitous. As Derrida articulates, “For 
there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, re-
turn, exchange, counterfeit, or debt.”26  In essence, 
the gift must be free, in all senses of  the term. On 
a certain level this character of  the gift would be 
obvious, but Derrida takes a very hard stance on the 
purity of  the gift’s gratuitousness. For him, any reci-
procity for a gift given is tantamount to repayment 
(which nullifies the gift), any satisfaction or even 
giving intention on the part of  the giver is the same 
as reimbursement (also nullifying the gift), and even 
any recognition of  the gift or the giver on the part of  
the receiver is equal to compensation (which, of  
course, nullifies the gift as well).27  The character of  
gratuitousness is itself  the problematic—it does not 
on its own make the gift the impossible, but joining 
it to the structure and matter of  the gift does.
 The third constitutive element of  the gift—
its matter—has to do with its necessary dependence 
on systems of  economy and value. While the gift 
22 Derrida, Given Time, 11.
23 This is not to say that each component must be recognized by 
the others; rather, the gift needs to have each of these three parts 
to be considered any kind of transfer at all.
24 Derrida, Given Time, 11.
25 Ibid.,
26 Ibid., 12.
27 Ibid., 12, 13, 14, 16, 23.
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must be gratuitous, the gift itself  must have some 
value in order to qualify as a gift. What gift could 
be a gift if  it were in no sense valuable, at least to 
some degree?  Further, a gift’s value is generally 
determined by an economy, whether it is of  simple 
economy or of  symbolic28 value. This is what Der-
rida means when he says, “Now the gift, if  there is 
any, would no doubt be related to economy. One 
cannot treat the gift … without treating this relation 
to economy, even to the money economy.”29  The 
point for Derrida is that the gift is inseparable from 
value and economy on the one hand, but that on 
the other it must be in a way separated from value 
and economy. The circle of  economic exchange is 
assumed by the gift, but it must remain foreign to 
the gift. In Derrida’s words, “If  the figure of  the 
circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain 
aneconomic. Not that it remains foreign to the circle, 
but it must keep a relation of  foreignness to the 
circle.”30  If  the gift touches economy, then it is no 
longer a gift, but if  it is completely separated from 
economy, then likewise it is no longer a gift. Again, 
this on its own does not preclude the possibility 
of  the gift, but when it is taken with the other two 
constitutive elements, the gift remains the impos-
sible.
 While Derrida goes to lengths to explain 
why the gift is the impossible, he nevertheless does 
not rule out the gift’s reality. The structure, char-
acter, and matter of  the gift preclude its possibil-
ity, but they do not undo the gift as gift. Derrida 
circumvents the inherent impossibility of  the gift by 
arguing that the gift, if  there is any, takes place only 
on the condition of  forgetting.31  For Derrida, if  
the gift is recognized as what it is, it vanishes. Rec-
ognizing the gift as what it is would require seeing 
the structure, character, and matter all at the same 
time—and that is exactly what is impossible about 
the gift. The very constitution of  the gift makes it 
the impossible, so recognition or remembrance of  
the gift jars it out of  reality and hides it again in 
impossibility. Derrida does not argue that the gift 
is an impossible phenomenon; instead, he argues 
that it cannot present itself  as a phenomenon, 
because as a phenomenon it is the impossible. In 
his words, “The gift itself—we dare not say the gift 
28 This use of symbolic is not the same as the term in Chauvet, but 
a discussion of that difference must wait just a bit.
29 Derrida, Given Time, 7. Emphasis in original.
30 Ibid. Emphases in original.
31 Ibid., 16-18.
in itself—will never be confused with the presence 
of  its phenomenon.”32  Therefore, for the gift to 
take place, it relies completely on the condition of  
forgetting—both the forgetting of  the giver and the 
receiver.
 On the part of  the giver, recall that for 
Derrida the simple intention to give is enough to 
nullify the gift. The reason for this is that intention 
to give (to say nothing of  actually giving) spontane-
ously creates in the giver a sense of  self-satisfac-
tion.33  Since this is the case, the giver has received 
something in the act of  giving, and so the gift’s 
relation of  foreignness to the circle of  economic 
exchange has been compromised, and the gift 
vanishes. For Derrida, if  there is any reception of  
anything in the act of  giving, then the gift is nullified. 
He is not content to separate giving and receiving 
from each other if  they are consequent upon the 
same action. For him, if  giving and receiving are 
parts of  a single action, then the gift is nullified. 
In this light, the giver must forget both the giving 
and the gift itself, and only then can the gift, as the 
impossible, take place.
 The receiver’s forgetting is not altogether 
different from the forgetting required of  the giver. 
For Derrida, as soon as the receiver recognizes the 
gift (that is, recognizes him- or herself  as a receiver), 
he or she is put under a feeling of  obligation.34  
This feeling, whether intuited or made explicit, nul-
lifies the gift. Derrida argues that the actual perfor-
mance of  receiving makes no difference as far as 
the integrity of  the gift is concerned. For him, even 
if  the intended receiver refuses the gift, the mere 
recognition that it was offered is enough to cause 
the gift to vanish.35  On the one hand the giver—if  
he or she recognizes the gift—receives in some sense 
(which destroys the gift), and on the other the 
receiver—if  he or she recognizes the gift—gives in 
some sense (whether giving thanks, feeling under 
obligation, or whatever), and such a fact causes 
the gift to fall back into impossibility. For Derrida, 
recognition of  the gift, whether on the part of  
the giver or the receiver, nullifies it. The gift is the 
impossible—it might be real and concrete, but only 





36 Derrida does mention that this forgetting cannot be a simple 
non-experience. The gift must be really experienced, but then 
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Chauvet and Derrida: A Conversation
 A first point of  conversation between 
Chauvet and Derrida must be the question of  
how blatantly (or not) the gift can present itself  
as such to observers and participants. Recall that 
Chauvet essentially takes Mauss at his word when 
he describes archaic societies that operate on an 
“economy” of  gift exchange.37  Derrida however, 
argues that “Marcel Mauss’s The Gift speaks of  
everything but the gift: It deals with economy, 
exchange, contract (do ut des), it speaks of  raising the 
stakes, sacrifice, gift and countergift.”38  For Derrida, 
the mere fact that the societies Mauss discusses can 
intimate obligation and reciprocity means that they 
are outside the realm of  the gift. They do not give 
gifts, because there are always strings attached.
 For Chauvet (as well as for Mauss), reci-
procity and return-gift do not suffice to nullify 
gift giving. This is the first legitimate difference 
between Chauvet and Derrida as they approach the 
gift: Chauvet calls the gift what Derrida lumps in 
with economic exchange. To be fair, Chauvet is not 
unaware of  what he is doing—he knows that neces-
sary reciprocity or “obligatory generosity” might be 
terms that would set off  the likes of  Derrida, but 
he joins Mauss in saying “The terms which we have 
used—present, gift—are not in themselves com-
pletely exact. We find no others; this is the best we 
can do.”39  However, Chauvet would not be content 
to concede that what he calls the gift is really just 
veiled market business. He holds that economic 
systems of  gift exchange are “of  a completely different 
order than that of  the marketplace or of  value.”40  
For Chauvet, while gift exchanges do not always (or, 
he might agree with Derrida in saying, ever) appear 
in the purity of  satisfying the three constitutive ele-
ments of  the Derridian concept of  the gift, he also 
maintains that the gift as it appears is still quali-
tatively different than payment—reciprocity and 
attached strings included. Chauvet argues that the 
gift as it appears in phenomena is actually symbolic 
exchange, which separates it from market exchange.
completely forgotten as such. It must reveal itself, but in doing 
so immediately conceal itself again in the same instant. This is 
part of its impossibility (and one that runs beyond the scope 
of this discussion)—the gift is impossible because its necessary 
condition, immediate forgetting, defies time. (C.f. Derrida, Given 
Time, 17-22.)
37 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 100-102.
38 Derrida, Given Time, 24.
39 Marcel Mauss, qtd. in Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 101.
40 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 100. Emphasis in original.
 At this point, Chauvet’s insistence upon us-
ing the category of  symbol—specifically as separate 
from categories of  value and economy—produces a 
distinction that is foreign to Derrida. Derrida does 
not immediately appear to have a robust philosophy 
of  the symbol. He does use the term, but seems 
to do so in a far more conventional than rigorous 
sense: symbol (or symbolic) for him connotes non-
material objects, like gratification or satisfaction, 
that are generally “paid” to oneself  if  one does not 
forget the gift.41  Derrida does not attempt to con-
flate symbol and sign—for him the symbol surely 
bears a reality to the receiver—but he does equate 
the reality borne by the symbol with an object of  
economy. For him, it seems that non-material reali-
ties—satisfaction, gratitude, forgiveness, perhaps 
even love—amount qualitatively to the same thing 
as dollars and cents where the gift is concerned. 
They are forms of  payment or repayment; they 
make the gift the impossible, rather than liberating 
it from economy.
 The question becomes, is Chauvet right 
to distinguish the symbolic order from that of  
sign and economy?  Is there a qualitative differ-
ence between symbols and the realities they bear 
on the one hand, and signs and the economies they 
represent on the other?  One might find a partial 
answer to this question in the rationale Chauvet 
gives for distinguishing symbol and sign (i.e. gift 
and economy): for him, symbols do not simply bear 
satisfaction or gratitude. Symbols might represent 
those things, but they bear the reality of  the giver to 
the receiver.42  This is a concept to which Derrida 
pays little if  any attention. For Chauvet, when a gift 
is given, i.e. when a symbolic exchange is performed, 
the symbol mediates the reality of  one entity to 
another. It is saturated not just with feelings or con-
victions; it is saturated with the self who gives. This 
may not satisfy the three elements of  the gift that 
are necessary for Derrida, but it may still separate 
the symbol from market exchange. Selves cannot 
be paid one to another—for Chauvet they may be 
mediated symbolically, but that can only be a gift, not 
a market exchange.
 Chauvet’s oft-repeated concept of  grace 
mediated in the sacraments provides a good ex-
ample of  the difference Chauvet sees that Der-
rida does not. Recall that for Chauvet, God gives 
41 Derrida, Given Time, 11, 14, 23.
42 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 119.
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Godself  in the sacraments, being mediated through 
the physical symbols of  the rituals, and humans 
respond by giving themselves symbolically through 
their own actions and gifts. It remains important 
that for Chauvet, Christians’ reception and response 
constitute a single act—God gives, and Christians 
receive/respond. Christians do not, in Chauvet’s 
view, receive and then respond. Given this construc-
tion, what happens in the sacraments—perhaps 
most explicitly in the Eucharist—is a symbolic 
exchange, that is, an actual exchange of  gifts. Chris-
tians receive the Triune God, and give themselves 
to God and others.43
 Could Derrida see in this symbolic ex-
change something that is quite different from 
market exchange?  It does not seem so. It would 
be an open question whether or not Derrida could 
assent to an idea of  symbols in which they mediate 
the reality of  those who give them, but regardless 
of  whether he could or not, he would still argue 
that exchange can have nothing to do with the gift. 
Symbolic exchange, for Derrida, would eliminate 
the gift simply because it is an exchange. There is 
reciprocity; ergo there is no gift. There is return-gift; 
ergo the gift itself  vanishes. Exchange for Derrida 
must remain alien to the gift. 
 In this light, there appear two main differ-
ences between Derrida and Chauvet with respect to 
symbol and the gift. First and perhaps more obvi-
ously, there is the difference in their definitions of  
the gift. Chauvet can speak of  reciprocity in the gift 
because of  his concept of  symbol and mediation. 
Derrida would shun such an idea because the gift 
can admit of  no reciprocity. While this may or may 
not be a complete impasse between the two figures, 
it brings to light the second difference:
 The second difference that appears is 
one of  hermeneutics. Chauvet, as he employs an 
explicitly Christian/sacramental hermeneutic, is able 
to speak of  symbolic exchange and consequently 
the gift to a certain extent because revelation allows 
him to do so. God giving Godself  by the mediation 
of  the sacraments is a claim steeped in the Christian 
tradition nearly from the beginning. What Chauvet 
has done is reckoned with this from the standpoint 
of  contemporary philosophy,44 and has concluded 
43 This of course is the ideal case. Chauvet describes a vision of 
symbols and sacraments—the fact that it does not play out al-
ways and everywhere does not invalidate the fact that it does 
play out sometimes and somewhere.
44 A good deal of Chauvet’s project is a critique of traditional 
that from the Christian standpoint, gift and return-gift 
touch each other in the sacraments. Christians do 
not (because they cannot) repay God by their ac-
tions. Ethics as response to liturgy is actually ethics 
as reception in liturgy. This fact—that Christians do 
not give things back to God or others, but rather 
receive grace by giving themselves to others—is the 
insight that allows Chauvet to distinguish between 
symbolic (gift) exchange and market exchange. The 
distinction is not a simple product of  his presup-
positions, but his hermeneutical approach certainly 
does make the distinction possible. 
 Derrida, for his part, is dependant upon 
his hermeneutic just as much as Chauvet. This can 
be most easily seen in Derrida’s starting point: the 
gift as the impossible. Without giving too much into 
cynicism, one can tentatively ask this: if  Derrida 
begins with the assertion that the gift is an enigma, 
the impossible, then who could reasonably expect 
him to conclude anything else?  Or, more directly, 
one must ask of  Derrida why he can conceive of  
the gift as the impossible. Is it primarily because 
of  his deductions and arguments?  This of  course 
might be so (just as Chauvet might have put together 
his vision of  symbol and gift simply by reflecting 
on Christian rites and reflections), but is it likely?  
Would it not be equally likely to maintain that what 
allows Derrida to form his rather rigorous concep-
tion of  the gift as the impossible is instead the 
fact that he does not share Chauvet’s hermeneutic 
of  Christianity?  Derrida has little hermeneutical 
reason to defend the gift in symbol or sacrament (it 
is noteworthy that he is quite comfortable with the 
idea of  infinite deferral of  “the impossible,” i.e. the 
gift that is essentially never given),45 so he ends up 
with the gift as the impossible. Again, like Chauvet, 
this is not a simple product of  his presuppositions, 
but his hermeneutical principles certainly make his 
conclusions possible. 
scholastic, and even onto-theological approaches to sacraments 
and the symbol/gift. C.f. Lieven Boeve, “Theology in a Post-
modern Context and the Hermeneutical Project of Louis-Marie 
Chauvet,” in Sacraments: Revelation of the Humanity of God: Engag-
ing the Fundamental Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet, eds. Philippe 
Bordeyne and Bruce T. Morrill (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical 
Press, 2008), 7-11.
45 John D. Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible: On God and 
the Gift in Derrida and Marion,” in God, the Gift, and Postmod-
ernism, eds. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Blooming-
ton, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 185-186.
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Conclusion
 This discussion has argued that the main 
difference between Louis-Marie Chauvet and 
Jacques Derrida with regard to the gift is the fact 
that Chauvet is content to speak of  the gift even 
within the context of  some exchange (i.e. symbolic 
exchange), while Derrida cannot admit into the gift 
any hint of  reciprocity or return. Beginning with 
Chauvet’s concept of  the symbol and its relation to 
the order of  gift exchange—as opposed to the sign 
and its relation to market economy—the discussion 
moved on to briefly explore the reason Chauvet is 
comfortable speaking of  the gift within symbolic 
exchange. For Chauvet, the symbol/gift is a bearer 
of  the reality of  the giver, a mediation of  presence. 
As such, it is qualitatively different from economic 
exchange. This is thrown into sharp relief  when 
speaking about Christian symbols in the sacraments, 
and the reality of  grace they mediate. For Chauvet, 
the only way to really receive the gift of  grace (and 
for him it is a gift) is to respond with the return-
gift of  one’s self  in service to others. Receiving 
and returning the gift do not invalidate the gift for 
Chauvet; they make it possible in the first place.
 Derrida’s conception of  the gift is quite 
different. For him, reciprocity of  any kind nul-
lifies the gift. The authentic gift, for Derrida, is 
constituted in three ways: First, its structure is one 
of  someone giving something to someone else. 
Second, its character must be complete gratuitous-
ness, else it falls back into economy. Third, its 
matter must be composed of  value and economy, 
but only insofar as the gift retains a relationship of  
foreignness and interruption to value and economy. 
Consequently, Derrida composes a vision of  the 
gift that requires a radical forgetting, if  the gift is 
ever to take place. The giver cannot remember the 
gift, and the receiver cannot remember the gift—in 
fact neither can even continue to recognize the gift as 
such, on pain of  invalidating it as the gift. 
 After these (all too) brief  explanations of  
Chauvet and Derrida, the discussion moved on to 
maintain that Chauvet’s concept of  symbol gives 
him access to a distinction of  which Derrida is 
either unaware or to which he refuses to assent. The 
qualitative difference between symbolic exchange 
and economic/market exchange in Chauvet is, in 
Derrida, no difference at all—for him, the two 
are essentially the same. The discussion finishes 
by arguing that in light of  Chauvet’s conflation of  
reception and ethics/return-gift—and Derrida’s 
insistence that such a construction would be absurd 
for the gift—the hermeneutical approaches of  
each author most likely play a part in their respec-
tive ability or inability to see the gift in exchange 
(i.e. symbolic exchange). Their conclusions do not 
spring immediately from their start-points without 
reflection, but it is unlikely that their beginning as-
sumptions have nothing to do with their completed 
visions.
